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Life and Technology in Bergson’s Creative Evolution


I. Bergson and Technology

	It is commonly known that Henri Bergson is famous for his philosophy of life rather than his philosophy of technology. Bergson is not a typical philosopher of technology as we have usually studied in philosophy class, such as Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas or other Frankfurt School thinkers, who have offered a “humanistic” account on technology starting from a critique of technological determinism and instrumental rationality in the crisis of modern civilization. These humanistic critiques are considered as the responses to the domination of technology over humanity. They begin with an opposition between technology and human beings. By contrast, Bergson has provided us a “biological” account on “the genesis of technology” that firstly considers mechanical invention as a biological function and an indispensable part to biological life in the process of evolution. It is true that the Bergson has never articulated technology as a main topic in his philosophy in comparison with other issues, such as life, matter, intuition, duration, free will, memory, morality and religion, etc. However, if we read Bergson carefully, he has already touched on a series of issues surrounding the problem of technology that basically includes two parts: 1) technology in the evolution of life, for example, in Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson critiques mechanism as an intelligent thinking which is incapable of understanding the true nature of life, but technology is a product of intelligence in the evolution of human beings; 2) the significance of technology in social and moral domains, for example, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), Bergson considers that mechanical invention as a “natural gift” but it also generates the problem in the industrial and military use; and he finally builds up a link between mechanism and mysticism, turning mechanical invention as “a supplement of soul”. 

As regards the technological significance in social and moral domains, Bergson in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion mentions that human beings must use matter as a support to free themselves from the limits of matter. Matter is both instrument and obstacle (TS94). This material support comes from the power of machinery (TS267). But this paradoxical relation of human resistance to matter has been described early on as freedom of consciousness and life by human mastery (control) of matter in the intelligent invention of instruments in Creative Evolution. Bergson explains that technology has its purpose on carrying the humanity to the highest level of freedom. The freedom of life is accomplished by means of human intelligence in the fabrication of instrument. In Creative Evolution, although the central theme is focused on the concept of life, the idea of technology has become an epistemological issue followed by the critique of mechanism. Here, I would like to introduce Canguilhem’s comment on this critique of mechanism. In his article “Note on the situation of biological philosophy in France” (1947)​[1]​, Cangulihem mentions that “the value of Bergsonian philosophy” in its contribution to French philosophy is: 

“to understand the true relationship of organism and mechanism, to develop a biological philosophy of machinism, to conceive machines as the organs of life, and to lay down the base of a general organology.”​[2]​

Bergson has developed a “biological philosophy of machinism” that brings out an integration of machine with organism in which machines are conceived as the organs of life. Then, Canguilhem continues to elaborate this idea in his essay “Machine and Organism” (1947). He thinks that Bergson’s Creative Evolution is “a treatise of general organology”.​[3]​ As such, the mechanical invention is tied up with “biological function” which is included in “an aspect of the organization of matter by life”.​[4]​ The objective of a Bergsonian organology is “to inscribe the mechanical within the organic,”​[5]​ “to return mechanism to its place in life and for life” and “to reinsert the history of mechanism into the history of life”. ​[6]​ 





II. Life and Knowledge

	Bergson does not start to question about technology with an opposition of technology to life. For Bergson, there is a “dialectics” between life and technology. Life and technology are mutually interconnected but they are different to one another. Technology is not simply externalized from life and life is not simply alienated from technology. The opposition of technology to life is mainly caused by the intervention of mechanism in the knowledge of life. On the one hand, Bergson rejects a claim that the true nature of life can be identical with mechanical principles and perfectly understood by mechanism. Mechanistic science is criticized for its construction of an artificial system in which the living organisms are considered being no different from inert matter (CE153). The living organisms are reduced to the mechanical models “in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead” (CE165). However, on the other hand, life is a mechanics. Life implies a technological character which is irreducible to anything else. There is “a mechanics of transformation” in organic activity that cannot be mathematically developed as a mechanism along with the geometrical and spatialized modes of thought (CE31-32). Such mechanics consists in the organization of living matter. It is also extended to the fabrication of instruments through the active mode of intellectual thinking on unorganized matter. At this point, technology is attributed to the creation of life.
  
	Life implies a technological character but it cannot be understood by mechanistic science. Why does mechanism cause trouble in our understanding of the true nature of life? Basically, Bergson thinks that mechanism is an outcome of intellectual thinking. But “The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life” (CE165). Mechanism implies a kind of cinematographical model of intellect (CE312). Such mechanistic model develops an operation in which the process of evolution first of all is broken into distinctive parts and then they are picked up together in order to construct the reality of movement. This reconstruction of evolution is like a film which is composed of a series of photographs in order to represent the mobile nature of movement by the immobile parts of matter. In fact, the error of mechanism consists in ignoring the truth of change and the reality of movement, that is to say, ‘duration’. Bergson notices that mechanism is introduced as a principle underlying the theory of evolution. For example, Hebert Spencer’s “false evolutionism” is criticized for “reconstructing evolution with fragments of the evolved” (CE364). It invents a reductive and deterministic model of evolution. As such, the problem of mechanism is caused by our ‘mechanistic instinct of mind’ that prevents us from seeing the truth of duration in the process of change. This mechanistic mindset is not able to understand its own mechanism. As a consequence, the reality of change would be reduced to “an arrangement or rearrangement of parts,” and the irreversibility of time would be thought as a sensible appearance due to our ignorance (CE17).

	Obviously, duration is excluded from the mechanistic model of evolution. But this does not mean that mechanism does not imply any dimension of time in evolution. The mechanistic view of time consists in a reconstruction of the whole of reality by a measurement of time. Duration is reduced to a series of measurable parts of “time”.  Here, time does not have any effect to reality. Time only exists in mind. The proper way to understand mechanistic view of time is “eternity” which is the temporal condition on which the totality of reality is posited. Bergson finds out that the problem of mechanism implies 

“a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once.” (CE39) 

Time in mechanistic view only functions an independent variable to all things in the physical world. It is excluded from the biological processes of the living beings. It is not duration at all. It is only a scientific measurement according to the mechanistic model. Bergson stresses that 

“The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that all is given. On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance to a superhuman intellect capable of making the calculation.” (CE37) 

The main idea of mechanism is derived from a hypothesis that time is calculable by our intelligent capability. With this intelligent capability, the future and the past are considered as the calculable functions of the present.

Although mechanism as a way of intelligent thinking that is incapable of reaching the truth of life in duration, this does not mean that life is necessarily against knowledge. The aim of Bergson’s critique of mechanism is to remind us that we must find a new way of reconstructing a link between life and knowledge (CE viii). As Bergson writes,

“This amounts to saying that theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable. A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the concepts which the understanding puts at its disposal: it can but enclose the facts, willing or not, in pre-existing frames which it regards as ultimate……On the other hand, a theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly.” (CExiii)

Bergson is not anti-intellect but he is anti-intellecutalism. For intellectualism, intelligence is something already given which is transcendent to life and also it can cover the whole reality. Rather, Bergson argues that intelligence is a faculty of knowledge which emerges from the evolution of life and it is a natural outcome which is generated from life. It is life that produces knowledge. But life is not an irrational power which is hostile to any form of knowledge. If life evolves, knowledge must also evolve too. In order to move beyond mechanism and to understand the true nature of life, we must search for a different sort of knowledge, namely, the intuitive knowledge. Intuition is the method of theory of knowledge and that of metaphysics. The theme of intuitive metaphysics is concerned with duration as the ultimate reality, so to speak, to think in duration from which we can see that everything is “not” given but “sub specie durationis” (from the point of view of duration) (CM151) Intuitive knowledge goes beyond the limit of intelligence in order to realize evolution as temporal phenomenon or creative duration. Here, the theory of life is not found in the level of intelligence but in the intuitive knowledge. It is the intuitive knowledge that can help us to understand how life becomes living matter in the dimension of time that is distinguished from inert matter. We must think about life in terms of time instead of an immaterial substance. From the perspective of duration, life is “a tendency to act on inert matter” (CE96). The evolution of life does not proceed from the assemblage of the material pieces but proceed from the differentiation of life (division of life) (CE89). In this differentiation of life, we can approach to the genesis of technology that is an act of life on matter.

	Here, we must explore how Bergson describes the evolution of life as a movement of differentiation. Basically, life is a tendency to differentiate, to create, to organize and to act on matter. This is the “élan vital” (CE87-88). The élan vital is an image borrowed from the empirical world (CE257). It is not a mystical force but rather a power of time, a power to think evolution in time.​[7]​ It is described as “an original impetus of life” (CE26) or “the current of life” (CE87), to pass from generation to generation, to accumulate the original characteristics of living species and to create new species, as long as it is divided into divergent lines of evolution. Bergson writes that 

“This impetus, sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species. In general, when species have begun to diverge from a common stock, they accentuate their divergence as they progress in their evolution.” (CE 87)










III. Instinct and Intelligence

As Bergson says, instinct and intelligence are two distinctive ways of inventing and utilizing the instruments for the purposes of life’s survival. Here, I am going to offer few remarks on discussing the distinction between these two tendencies. 

First of all, we must know that Bergson’s concept of life implies a sort of pragmatic reasoning. That is to say, life is a power of problem-solving in the particular environments. It is in this context that living being is conceived as a solution to the problem of life.​[9]​ For living being, there is a mutual reliance between biology and technology in which both of them come up to fulfill their complementary needs of each other. This mutual reliance is properly explained by Bergson in his division between instinct and intelligence in the animal world. In Bergson’s view, intelligence and instinct are not different degrees of one and the same tendency. Both of them are two different tendencies of life, two divergent forms of knowledge and two different methods of acting on matter and transforming the material environment into the beneficial factors for the survival of life. Bergson writes that “Instinct and intelligence therefore represent two divergent solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem.” (CE143) 

Then, my second remark concerns how the distinction between instinct and intelligence implies the nature of “instrument”. Here, the instrument refers to a technological object in which we can understand the characteristics of these two tendencies and the genesis of technology in Bergson: “instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments.” (CE140) The genesis of technological object is a process of refinement of tools: to make the tools perfectly for the purpose of earning profits. Instinct makes use of organs or any part of body of living organism as organized instruments while intelligence is good at inventing and utilizing tools and machines as unorganized instruments. To be precise, instinct inclines to immediately tackle the problem of survival in its environment by searching the appropriate instruments at hand. These instruments are ready-made instruments. They make and fix themselves without invoking to any external force from nature. They are part of their physical bodies of those living organisms, namely, ‘organs’. In Bergson’s view, “Instinct is therefore necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument for a specific object.” (CE140) Their characteristics are highlighted in their perfect and immediate adaptations to their environments (CE142). But the instinctual instrument remains in the same body structure inside the organism and its application is restricted and fixed to particular contexts. By contrast, intellect inclines to fabricate matter as unorganized instrument which are external to the bodies of living organisms. These unorganized instruments are considered as the extension of the powers of living bodies and the continuities of the organization of living organisms. But they are mediated because we need to learn how to fabricate them and to use them properly (CE142). In other words, these technical objects are required to be encoded and transmitted into the way for its utilization. They are imperfect instruments because they are not perfectly adaptable to a specific environment like instinct. Although they are fabricated by the living body endowed with intelligence, they cost a lot of efforts to make and even to handle (CE140). That is true, there are some disadvantages of intelligent instruments in their utilizations but these disadvantages also imply some advantages at the same time. That is to say, the efforts on the fabrication of intelligent instrument can enrich the power of action and transform the initial works of organization into the advanced level of the use. The intelligent instrument redefines the meaning of organization and creates the new needs of life in order to continue the creation of life. In Bergson’s words, intelligence “is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.” (CE139) When a new tool is invented, it will create the other new tools. But these instruments never close themselves in the limited circle like the instinctual one. Rather, their actions move towards the unlimited field, so that they can enable the living organism to reach more far and to live more free. When it comes to the higher degree of fabrication, intelligence can “construct constructive machinery.” (CE141) At the end, we can understand that how intelligent fabrication reaches at the cumulative point where it is concerned with the freedom of consciousness. All these intelligent instruments not only expand the scope of human action but also increase the power and freedom of humanity.

 	Here, we arrive at the third remark about the supplementary role of technology to life in the fabrication of intelligence. Intelligence is the human faculty which makes use of the effort of élan vital to master and to divide matter in order to turn it for making the profits. Its concern is practice. Bergson writes that “the tendency of the intellect is to fabricate” (CE153). Intelligence is a fabricating mode of thinking. In fact, fabrication is a method of intelligence to combine the parts of matter in order to form a totality, or to arrange different parts of matter for bringing them together as a tool or a machine which is served as an instrument of life for its utility.    

“Fabricating consists in shaping matter, in making it supple and in bending it, in converting it into an instrument in order to become master of it. It is this mastery that profits humanity, much more even than the material result of the invention itself.” (CE182-183) 

The success of intelligence in fabrication is consisted in the elevation of humanity and the enlargement of his perception through the mastery of matter. Technological innovations signify a new stage in the development of human societies. They have reshaped the new relations of human beings to themselves, their relations to society and nature. They produce and reproduce the new modes of thoughts and existences. But the process of technological innovation would not end up in a particular moment. Rather, it is an unending process of invention. New technological inventions would create new tools and new needs of life and these inventions would follow by the creation of the other new tools and new needs. 

	The contribution of technological invention to humanity is consisted in the common function of artificial instruments, that is, the prolongation of natural organism. As Bergson writes, “an artificial organ by which the natural organism is extended.” (CE141) Hence, the artificial ‘organ’ bears a function that can extend and prolong the capability of natural organism in order to open up the new scope of experience. Therefore, these artificial instruments are conceived as new organs in the attachment to the body of organisms.  

“Thus, all the elementary forces of the intellect tend to transform matter into an instrument of action, that is, in the etymological sense of the word, into an organ. Life, not content with producing organisms, would fain give them as an appendage inorganic matter itself, converted into an immense organ by the industry of the living being. Such is the initial task it assigns to intelligence.” (CE161)

What intelligence has changed in technological innovation is not only the transformation of matter into instrument but also the difference between organs and machines. To some extent, Bergson has broken up the division between the natural and the artificial in defining the relation of technology to life in terms of the difference between instinctual and intellectual instruments. In this case, technological object has become individualized to living organism no matter what it is natural or artificial. Paola Marrait argues that for Bergson “there is no ontological difference whatsoever between organs and machines.”​[10]​ There is nothing essentially given to differentiate organs and machines. Rather, what distinguishes two of them is the material elements of which they are made. The only difference here is the material difference between organs and machines. That is to say, organs are organic tools while machines are inorganic tools. Both of them are the outcomes of different formations in the evolution of life. They have different functions in order to serve different purposes of life. Here, we can say that Bergson somehow goes against a sort of essentialist definition on the difference between the organic and the mechanic, the natural and the artificial, which are based on the terms of substances.​[11]​ Nevertheless, Bergson also indicates that even unorganized matter in technological fabrication can be “converted” to be organized in a form as long as this artificial instrument is conceived as a part of the organization of natural organism. At this level, there is an intuitive difference between organized matter and unorganized matter. Both of them are no longer seen in terms of substances. They are rather two different movements in duration.

As we have mentioned above, the movement of élan vital distinguishes organized matter from unorganized matter. Here, we can say that technological matter is the third type of matter, namely “inorganic organized matter”.​[12]​ But technological object is distinguished from biological being. It is the materialization of intelligent life instead of the organization of living organism (CE138). Nevertheless, there is an evolution of matter following by the evolution of life. Matter evolves in technological fabrication in which it is created in the new forms of existence. Such new forms of existence can help us to understand how matter becomes obstacles and instruments in its relation to life’s creation. So, we can say that, in this creative process, technology implies “a technology of life” but there is also “a life of technology” in matter.​[13]​ The idea of “élan vital” is extended to “élan technique”: a technological impulse in life’s creation. Therefore, we cannot think about “technology” in the context that is separated from life evolution. 

 	At last, our final remark, Bergson has extended the meaning of technology to the other forms of instrumental reason, namely, the formation of conceptual knowledge for the science of analysis. He redefines the forms of technology according to which concepts, symbols and language are also included. Basically, the intellect is an active mode of thought which is able to order, divide, isolate, manufacture and transform unorganized matter into different forms of instruments. But the intellect also develops a series of functions at the higher level, including representation, calculation, speculation, abstraction and generalization. Here, the intellectual instrumentality is developed as an ability to categorize and to conceptualize matter that becomes a series of conceptual tools for the analysis of science. In fact, the successful formation of this intellectual instrument is dependent on the compromise of the living organisms with the environments and the material elements what they can acquire. This achievement also means that the success of evolution can be completed, not only by physical and organic transformation, but also by the dialectics between intellectual and material development. Here, we can have a new understanding of the interaction between technology and knowledge: technology precedes and conditions scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is concentrated on matter and it is developed from the utilization of concepts and categories for the division of matter (CE155-157). But this conceptual utilization is also concerned with practical interests of organism because the intellect is a mode of thinking in fulfilling the requirements and necessities of life. This is why mechanistic models emerge from the natural tendency of intellectual mind and it extends its influence to both psychological and biological lives. Therefore, our intellectual knowledge of the world is not only scientifically constituted but also technologically featured. Such a claim has reversed a traditional belief of the priority of theory over practice: science provides a ground to the development of technology. If scientific knowledge is constituted by the intellect which is biologically interest concerned, technology must penetrate into the scientific forms of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is technologically characterized.


IV. The Bergsonian Legacy in Biophilosophy of Technology

	Now, we have to turn back to Canguilhem’s motif on the return of mechanism to life at the beginning part. As we have seen, Bergson in Creative Evolution has offered a biological account on the origin of technology and he has opened up a new way to understand technology as the organization of matter by life. His biological account of the origin of technology is an alternative to the mechanism. The problem of mechanism is consisted in turning one to ignore and forget the vital origin of machine or technology. In fact, the vital origin of technology is irreducible to any rational forms of the mechanical model. While technology is deprived of its vital origin, it has been reduced as a physical operation without considering it as an organic activity. This organic activity is mechanical invention. For Bergson, mechanical invention should be thought in the context of the élan vital’s creation other than the view of mechanistic science. The élan vital is a dynamic impetus which consists in “a need of creation” (CE251). It has never stopped creation and it does not create alone by its own self. It creates in its confrontation with the obstacle of matter in order to transform it and invent it. In this sense, the success of intelligence in mechanical invention first of all is to fulfill “the need of life” for its practical interests; then it is the success of élan vital for the fulfillment of “the need of creation”. Technology, here, is given a purpose on the liberation of consciousness and life in humanity from the natural condition of matter. It continues the creation of life in human history until it can elevate human life to the higher level of life that is the life of spirit (CE268).
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